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Abstract The phenomenon of cognitive penetration has received a lot of atten-
tion in recent epistemology, as it seems to make perceptual justification too easy to
come by for experientialist theories of justification. Some have tried to respond to
this challenge by arguing that cognitive penetration downgrades the epistemic sta-
tus of perceptual experience, thereby diminishing its justificatory power. I discuss
two examples of this strategy, and argue that they fail on several grounds. Most
importantly, they fail to realize that cognitive penetration is just an instance of
a larger problem for experientialist theories of perceptual justification. The chal-
lenge does not lie in explaining how cognitive penetration is able to downgrade
the epistemic status of perceptual experience, the challenge lies in explaining why
perceptual experience would have a special epistemic status to begin with. To
answer this challenge, experientialists have to solve the distinctiveness problem:
they have to explain what is so distinctive about perceptual experience that en-
ables it to provide evidential justification without being in need of justification
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itself. Unfortunately, an internalist answer to this problem does not appear to be
forthcoming, even though it would certainly help with explaining the problem of
cognitive penetration.
Keywords Cognitive penetration · Experientialism · Dogmatism · Distinctiveness
problem · Epistemic downgrade
Introduction
The phenomenon of cognitive penetration has recently received a lot of attention
in both philosophy of mind (Macpherson 2012; Wu 2013; Vetter and Newen 2014;
Chasid 2014; Zeimbekis and Raftopoulos Forthcoming) and epistemology (Siegel
2012, 2013a; Lyons 2011; McGrath 2013; Tucker 2014; Vahid 2014). The question
for philosophy of mind is whether perceptual experience can be truly ‘penetrated’
by cognition without changing any of the inputs being processed by the perceptual
system. That is, the question is whether perceptual experience can be different due
to top-down influences that have nothing to do with changing the inputs that are
being processed bottom-up. If such cognitive penetration occurs, then perception
is not just a receptive process but far more constructive than some have supposed.
For the purposes of this paper I will just accept that cognitive penetration of this
type is an existing phenomenon. The question that I am here interested in is epis-
temological in nature: does cognitive penetration present theories of perceptual
justification with any new or distinctive problems? My aim is to argue that, de-
spite the attention the phenomenon has so far received in epistemology, cognitive
penetration is just an instance of a much larger challenge specific to certain inter-
nalist theories of perceptual justification. If internalists feel pressured to amend
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their theory due to the phenomenon of cognitive penetration, I suggest they are
better off focusing on this larger challenge, or, better yet, leaving the internalist
camp entirely.
In §1, I briefly present the epistemic problem that arises from the phenomenon
of cognitive penetration. Although this problem appears most pressing for dog-
matism (Pryor 2000; Huemer 2001), other internalist views also suffer from it.
In general, the problem of cognitive penetration seems to target all experientialist
theories of perceptual justification, which take perceptual experiences to constitute
(defeasible) evidence for beliefs merely on the basis of their being perceptual expe-
riences.1 In §2, I discuss two responses to the problem provided by Susanna Siegel
(Siegel 2013a) and Matthew McGrath (McGrath 2013). Both of these responses
try to explain how a perceptual experience can be epistemically downgraded by
looking at similarities with epistemically pernicious belief-structures. I argue that
both these responses leave unexplained why both these experience- and belief-
structures are epistemically pernicious. In §3, I then present what I take to be
the real problem for experientialist views of perceptual justification: instead of
explaining how cognitive penetration can downgrade perceptual experience, they
have to explain why perceptual experiences would have a special epistemic status
to begin with. What is so distinctive about perceptual experience that allows it
to provide evidence for belief merely on the basis of it’s being a perceptual experi-
ence? This problem is even worse for those who, like Siegel and McGrath, take an
analogy with belief-structures seriously, as most people agree that beliefs are not
able to provide evidence for other beliefs merely on the basis of their nature as
1 Thus, evidentialists like Conee and Feldman (2004) are also in need of a response to this
problem.
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beliefs. In §4, I briefly consider some responses to this broader challenge, and ar-
gue that they are unsuccessful. I conclude that experientialists should focus on the
challenge raised by the distinctiveness problem rather than focus on an instance
of this challenge, i.e., cognitive penetration.
1 The Problem of Cognitive Penetration
Let’s start discussing the problem of cognitive penetration from the viewpoint of
the following theory of perceptual justification:
Perceptual Dogmatism: If it perceptually seems to S that P, then S
thereby has prima facie perceptual justification for P.2
According to this theory of perceptual justification, one can acquire prima
facie justification for the belief that P merely by having a perceptual experience,
or perceptual seeming, with a relevantly similar content.3 This proposal thus has
the benefit of making perceptual justification easily attainable in a way that seems
to accord with the phenomenology of how we arrive at our perceptual beliefs. We
don’t need to reason from premises about our experiences to conclusions about
the environment, nor do we need to eliminate skeptical hypotheses; we just need
to have a perceptual experience which represents that the world is such-and-so to
have justification for the belief that the world actually is such-and-so. Presumably,
2 Proponents of this account of justification include (Pryor 2000; Huemer 2001; Tucker 2010;
Chudnoff 2011).
3 See (Ghijsen 2015) for more on the distinction between perceptual experience and percep-
tual seeming, here I will use the terms interchangeably.
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if one then believes that the world is such-and-so on the basis of this experience,
one ends up with a belief that is both propositionally and doxastically justified.4
It’s important to note that this justification can be defeated by additional
considerations. For instance, if one knows that the lighting conditions are strange,
then a perceptual experience that the tie in front of you is black might not be
sufficient for ultima facie justification of the belief that the tie is black even if it
does provide prima facie justification for that belief. We will later see that this
provides proponents of perceptual dogmatism with one way of responding to cases
of cognitive penetration.
Now, briefly put, the problem that cognitive penetration poses for perceptual
dogmatism is that it seems to make justification too easy to obtain. Given that
perceptual dogmatism places no requirements on the etiology of a justifying per-
ceptual experience, even experiences that are causally influenced by wildly unjusti-
fied beliefs will provide prima facie justification for other beliefs. This seems to be
especially distressing because unjustified beliefs are not usually taken as possible
starting points for ending up with justified beliefs. Yet perceptual dogmatism has
the consequence that as soon as these unjustified beliefs become so powerful that
they actually start to cause perceptual experiences which reflect their contents,
then they can result in justified beliefs.
4 This is important to mention, given that the dogmatist’s thesis is usually phrased in
terms of propositional rather than doxastic justification. A perceptual experience could provide
propositional justification for a subject’s belief that P even if the subject’s actual belief that P
is doxastically unjustified because it was not based on the perceptual experience but on some
other bad ground (e.g., one’s horoscope).
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Of course one can complain that this is a slightly misleading way of putting
matters, as perceptual dogmatism does not hold that the unjustified beliefs them-
selves provide prima facie justification for other beliefs. It’s just that they might
cause certain states (i.e., perceptual experiences) that are capable of providing
such prima facie justification. Moreover, there certainly are cases where unjus-
tified beliefs can be the causal starting point for justified beliefs. For instance,
my unjustified belief that X is a bad philosopher might lead me to scrutinize X’s
arguments, thereby finding a flaw that I would have otherwise overlooked. The
unjustified belief causally leads to the belief that the argument is flawed, but this
does not detract from the justification of the latter belief.
Still, this last scenario does not appear relevantly similar to that of cases of
cognitive penetration. Looking at some examples might strengthen the idea that
perceptual dogmatism allows something that is actually epistemically illicit. Take
the following case by Peter Markie:
Suppose that we are prospecting for gold. You have learned to identify a
gold nugget on sight but I have no such knowledge. As the water washes
out of my pan, we both look at a pebble, which is in fact a gold nugget. My
desire to discover gold makes it seem to me as if the pebble is gold; your
learned identification skills make it seem that way to you.
(Markie 2005, pp. 356-7)
Let’s assume for the sake of argument that the perceptual seeming itself, in-
stead of a judgment that results from that seeming, is causally influenced by the
desire to discover gold. Then perceptual dogmatism has the result that both sub-
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jects in the example acquire prima facie justification for their beliefs, even though
only the expert really has the skills to identify gold.
This is a counter-intuitive result, but one could try to use several strategies to
explain away the intuition. For instance, the novice (Markie) but not the expert
might have a defeater for his belief as he has no reason to think that he can
actually identify gold nuggets on sight. This would mean that even though the
perceptual experience of the novice provides him with prima facie justification,
he lacks ultima facie justification because of some kind of defeater. However, this
line of explanation fails as it is already implausible to take the novice to just have
prima facie justification (Tucker 2010, p. 539). Another strategy tries to explain
the intuition by appealing to the blameworthiness of the novice in comparison to
the expert, or to the fact that the expert but not the novice is in the market for
knowledge (Tucker 2010, pp. 539-41). Although these strategies might go some way
towards explaining why we think that there is an epistemic difference between the
expert and the novice, they still do not seem to explain sufficiently why we (also)
have the intuition that the novice is not even prima facie justified considered on
his own.
To make this more plausible, consider the following different case by Susanna
Siegel:
Jill believes, without justification, that Jack is angry at her. The epistemi-
cally appropriate attitude for Jill to take toward the proposition that Jack
is angry at her is suspension of belief. But her attitude is epistemically
inappropriate. When she sees Jack, her belief makes him look angry to her.
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If she didn’t believe this, her experience wouldn’t represent him as angry.
(Siegel 2012, p. 209)
In this case, we are not making a comparison between a novice and an expert.
Instead, we look at one subject, Jill, who appears to form a belief in a way that
is epistemically illicit: her unjustified belief influences her perceptual experience
to such a degree that the experience is more of a representation of this prior un-
justified belief than a representation of how the world actually is. Now one might
again use an appeal to blameworthiness or absence of knowledge to explain away
our intuition, but this does not appear very plausible. What’s more, externalist
accounts are easily able to accommodate the intuition that the subjects are unjus-
tified in these bad cases of cognitive penetration — their belief-forming processes
are not reliable, their cognitive systems do not appear to be functioning properly,
etc. In the light of this alternative, it seems that cognitive penetration definitely
presents a challenge for perceptual dogmatism.
Let me note that the problem for perceptual dogmatism is not just that it al-
lows a seeming manipulated by desire or unjustified belief to produce prima facie
justification, as Chris Tucker presents it (Tucker 2014, p. 39). Instead, it necessi-
tates that a manipulated seeming produces prima facie justification, as all per-
ceptual seemings produce prima facie justification independent of their etiology.5
But the cognitive penetration problem does not just aﬄict perceptual dogmatism,
it’s a challenge for all experientialist theories of perceptual justification that make
5 This also means that perceptual dogmatism is, pace (Tucker 2014), worse off than, say,
reliabilists accounts of perceptual justification, as these accounts would at worst only allow
for prima facie justification in cases of cognitive penetration if the belief-forming process is
(conditionally) reliable.
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perceptual experiences into evidence for beliefs merely on the basis of their being
perceptual experiences.6 If merely being a perceptual experience is sufficient to
constitute evidence for belief, then all cognitively penetrated perceptual experi-
ences will also constitute evidence for belief, even if the cognitive penetrator is
epistemically outrageous. The problem seems to be that, just as unjustified beliefs
cannot constitute evidence for beliefs, badly cognitively penetrated experiences
also cannot constitute evidence for beliefs. This points to the fact that the etiology
of an experience should be taken into account when considering that experience’s
epistemic status. The next section will consider two internalist proposals which
attempt to do just that.
2 Accommodating Etiology Internalistically
In the previous section we saw that bad cases of cognitive penetration present a
challenge to experientialist theories of perceptual justification that do not take an
experience’s etiology into account in determining its justificatory power. Before
going to Siegel’s (2013a) and McGrath’s (2013) responses to this problem, let me
remark that there are also some internalists that are not worried about cognitive
penetration. These hard-liners just accept that cognitively penetrated experiences
produce prima facie justification as long as the cases are set up in a way that no
defeaters are present (Fumerton 2013; Huemer 2013). An important motivation
for this view is that it seems irrational not to accept one’s perceptual experiences
in the absence of any reasons to distrust them. If one has a cognitively penetrated
perceptual experience in the absence of any defeaters, then the only rational thing
6 This point is also made in different terms by (Siegel 2012, p. 219–21).
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to do is to believe what the experience is telling you. Although I agree that there
would be something irrational about a subject who mistrusted his experiences
without reason, this property of irrationality simply does not track the property
of epistemic justification. McGrath (2013) argues this point by using the following
example:
Suppose my evidence strongly points against P and against Q, but that
nevertheless I believe P. Then, if I continue to believe P, coherence requires
that I believe the disjunctive proposition P or Q if I entertain the question
[...] We want to say that it is reasonable for me to believe P or Q, insofar
as I already have a belief that P.
(McGrath 2013, p. 229)
Even though it certainly is reasonable, in some sense of the term, for me to
believe P or Q given that I already believe that P, in this case the belief is still
definitely not epistemically justified, given that I also have strong evidence against
P. Perhaps the positive epistemic property of the belief that P or Q can be called
conditional justification, given that it would be justified on the condition that P
is justified.7 Whatever one likes to call it, it is not the same as the property of
epistemic justification that we have so far been concerned with.
2.1 Downgraded Experiences
Susanna Siegel (2012; 2013a) does see the need for an alternative account, com-
patible with internalism, that can accommodate the cognitive penetration prob-
7 See (Lyons 2013) for more on the notion of conditional justification, and the role this
notion could also play in accounting for the New Evil Demon case.
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lem. According to Siegel, experiences can have rationally assessable etiologies that
might downgrade their epistemic status in a way that is different from their merely
being (conditionally) unreliable. Such rationally assessable etiologies are to be dis-
tinguished from etiologies that are a-rational because they have no connection to
any rational cognitive processing whatsoever. The idea is that the formation of
some beliefs or experiences could be “zaplike” (Siegel 2013a, p. 700) in the sense
that they are caused by e.g., God, or, less extreme, a bump on the head; causes
that have nothing to do with arriving at experience- or belief-outputs on the basis
of the kind of cognitive processing we would ordinarily take as rational.
Once we accept this distinction between rationally assessable and a-rational
etiologies, Siegel claims we can define a certain type of epistemically downgraded
experience in the following way:
An experience E with content C and etiology X is checkered with respect
to C iff:
• X is rationally assessable, and
• a belief with content C and etiology X* would be doxastically unjusti-
fied, where the output of X* is a belief with no intervening experience,
and X* has psychological elements sufficiently similar to X’s.
(Siegel 2013a, p. 716, my italics)
Thus, the thought behind Siegel’s account is that some experiences, i.e., check-
ered experiences, lack the power to (fully) justify certain beliefs because their
etiology is sufficiently similar to an etiology that would have led to unjustified
belief. So we no longer need to accept that in intuitively bad cases of cognitive
penetration, the perceptual experiences still provide immediate justification for
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the relevant beliefs. Their epistemically bad etiologies lead to an epistemic down-
grade that prevents them from providing sufficient justification for the relevant
beliefs.
Although there seems to be something right about the idea of epistemic down-
grade, we’ve been given rather crude tools to determine whether experiences are
checkered and thus downgraded. A reasonable question to ask is precisely when
experience-etiology X is sufficiently similar to the bad belief-etiology X*. Take the
case of Jill and Jack again. One might claim that the etiology X of Jill’s cognitively
penetrated experience that Jack looks angry (recall: it’s due to her prior unjusti-
fied belief that Jack is angry) is comparable to an etiology X* where Jill re-assesses
her belief that Jack is angry and on the basis of that belief alone again concludes
that Jack is angry. The belief that results from X* certainly looks unjustified, and
this would thus make etiology X result in a checkered experience. But, as Hamid
Vahid (2014) points out, what about a similar case with etiology Y in which Jill
actually becomes more sensitive to Jack’s emotional state (which happens to be
one of anger) because of her unjustified belief that Jack is angry?8
According to Siegel, etiology Y is relevantly different from etiology X*, and
should rather be compared to etiology Y* in which Jill’s theory of mind improves
and on the basis of which Jill then figures out that Jack is angry (Siegel 2013a,
p. 716). For instance, if Jill thinks about the reasons for Jack’s anger because of
her unjustified belief that he is angry, and then truly realizes that Jack must be
angry because he had eggs for breakfast even though he hates eggs, then the belief
that Jack is angry could turn out to be justified after all. The idea seems to be
8 Such cases of good cognitive penetration have also been raised as problems for Siegel’s
account by Jack Lyons (2011).
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that being more sensitive to Jack’s emotional state in etiology Y should be taken
as an intermediary step that should also show up in the compared belief-etiology
Y*.
However, it is difficult to see how we could, on this basis, end up with a prin-
cipled way of determining similarity of etiologies. Siegel herself claims that even
those cases in which cognitive penetration occurs via an effect on attention (e.g.,
Jill focuses more on specific anger-correlated facial features of Jack) can be cases
of checkered experiences (Siegel 2013a, p. 717).9 But it is difficult to see why such
a case wouldn’t be similar to the one in which Jill’s theory of mind improves.
Siegel appears to rely on prior intuitions about the epistemic (im)propriety of cog-
nitive penetration in her determination of the sufficiently similar belief-etiologies,
but that is exactly the opposite of how the account was supposed to work. The
account was supposed to tell us when a case of cognitive penetration was bad on
the basis of a similar belief-etiology, rather than tell us which belief-etiology was
similar on the basis of whether a case of cognitive penetration was bad. To have
a good theory of checkered experiences, we first need a good account of similarity
between etiologies, and from there we can then determine whether all our intu-
itions about cognitive penetration are accommodated. As it stands, the suggestion
appears too imprecise to be fully satisfying.
Next to this complaint about determining etiology-similarity, a different com-
plaint could be raised about the explanatory power of Siegel’s suggestion. Suppose
that we were able to provide a precise way of determining the sufficient similarity
between experience- and belief-etiology that Siegel’s account appeals to. There
would then still be a question as to why beliefs and experiences with those etiolo-
9 Note that the example in parentheses is not one that Siegel herself provides.
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gies are unable to confer justification onto further beliefs. What is it about being
this specific kind of etiology that makes the resulting experiences and beliefs into
downgraded epistemic states? It should be clear that one answer, that these eti-
ologies are simply (conditionally) unreliable, is off the table, as Siegel wants to
uphold an account compatible with a variety of internalist rather than externalist
positions.
Instead, Siegel proposes that we should look at this question in a rather differ-
ent light. According to Siegel, perceptual experiences share a certain property with
beliefs that make them into possible “conduits of ill-foundedness” (Siegel 2013b,
p. 754): they are both ways of endorsing certain contents. Contrast this with, say,
suppositions, mental states which also have propositional contents, but, unlike per-
ceptual experiences and beliefs, do not endorse those contents in any way. Now,
the fact that both perceptual experience and belief are endorsements of contents
could be used to explain why they can be epistemically downgraded when they
have certain etiologies. When an unjustified content is part of the etiology of an
experience or a belief, and this content is then endorsed by the experience or the
belief, the experience or belief have thereby become conduits of ill-foundedness:
they are no longer able to confer justification onto further beliefs which result from
the wrongly endorsed content.
This suggestion seems fine when one considers cases in which one starts from
an unjustified belief and then goes on to experience or further belief. However, the
phrase “conduit of ill-foundedness” already hints at a problem: to be a conduit
of ill-foundedness, ill-foundedness has to be already there to be transmitted. The
problem becomes more clear once one looks at cases in which desires or fears figure
in the relevant etiologies. These mental states might not be capable of having
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unjustified contents in the way that beliefs can, in which case there would be no
ill-foundedness to transmit. But even if they were capable of having such contents,
then it still is not true that an endorsement of such contents is always epistemically
improper. Examples of such cases are again those in which the desires or fears
actually make one more sensitive to the environment. In such cases, the resulting
perceptual experience is not downgraded at all, even though it could still be an
endorsement of the earlier content of desire or fear.10
So Siegel does have a problem in explaining what it is about belief- and
experience-etiologies that can downgrade their epistemic status. Nevertheless, we
certainly have some clear intuitions about which etiologies are epistemically good,
and which are epistemically bad. But this could easily be explained by pointing
to the fact that certain etiologies make experiences less sensitive to how the world
actually is, an explanation that is unfortunately of no help to someone who wants
to accommodate the problem of cognitive penetration in a way compatible with in-
ternalism about perceptual justification. Internalists are thus in need of a different
answer to the problem of cognitive penetration.
10 Siegel could retort that these latter cases are ones in which the content is not endorsed
only because of the ill-founded states in the etiology. But this seems to be true for almost
any plausible case of cognitive penetration; surely the environment always has some impact
on the experience. The question is exactly when the impact of the environment becomes too
small, and the intuitive answer to this question would appeal to a subject’s remaining sensitive
enough to changes in the environment — again, though, this answer is not open to internalists.
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2.2 Receptive Seemings
Just as Siegel, McGrath (2013) recognizes that cognitive penetration forms a chal-
lenge for the usual internalist theories of perceptual justification. And, like Siegel,
McGrath also thinks that some experiences can be epistemically downgraded to
such an extent that they are no longer able to provide immediate justification.
Only those experiences, or as McGrath prefers, seemings, that are receptive or
properly quasi-inferred from receptive seemings can justify a subject in believing
their contents. Let’s start by looking at the notion of a quasi-inference, with which
we can then distinguish between receptive and nonreceptive seemings:
Let us say that a transition from a seeming that P to a seeming that
Q is “quasi-inferential” just in case the transition that would result from
replacing these seemings with corresponding beliefs that P and Q would
count as genuine inference by the person [. . . ] I claim that quasi-inferential
transitions between seemings function epistemically in the way inference by
the person does: they can at best transmit the relevant epistemic property
of the inputs to the outputs; they cannot generate this property for the
outputs when it isn’t possessed by the inputs. In the case of inferential
transitions between beliefs, the epistemically relevant property which can
be transmitted is doxastic justification. In the case of transitions between
seemings, the property is justifying the subject in believing its content.
(McGrath 2013, p. 237)
With this notion of quasi-inference in hand, one can now distinguish between
receptive and nonreceptive seemings, where receptive seemings are ones that are
not outputs of quasi-inferential transitions and nonreceptive seemings are outputs
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of such transitions. According to McGrath, only receptive seemings generate the
property of justifying their subjects in believing their contents; nonreceptive seem-
ings just receive this property by transmission from receptive seemings by means
of a good quasi-inferential transition.
To find out which quasi-inferences are good, and which are bad, we first have
to know more about the conditions for there being any kind of inference in the
first place. According to McGrath, at least the following conditions are necessary:
(i) the input and output states [. . . ] must be mental states of the person, not
merely of a sub-personal system; and (ii) there must be an explanation in
terms of the person’s own mental states that “rationalizes” the transition,
i.e., that allows us to see the transition as the person’s treating the content
of the input state as supporting the content of the output state.
(McGrath 2013, p. 238)
Condition (ii) is relevant in determining whether a quasi-inference is good. If
a subject just jumps from the seeming that something looks yellow to the seeming
that it must be gold on the basis of his desire for gold, then there is an explana-
tion in terms of the person’s own mental states that “rationalizes” the transition:
because of his desire for gold, the person treats the content of the input state as
supporting the content of the output state. However, McGrath agrees that a quasi-
inferential transition of this sort certainly isn’t a good one. Good quasi-inferences,
in contrast, are those in which the rationalizing mental states are constituted by
a subject’s background knowledge. In combination with such background knowl-
edge, lower-level seemings of yellowish shapes will sufficiently support higher-level
seemings of gold.
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This already shows how the account is supposed to play out in problematic
cases of cognitive penetration. In bad cases of cognitive penetration, receptive
seemings have been “freely enriched” (McGrath 2013, p. 237) by wishful thinking or
unjustified beliefs to deliver nonreceptive seemings that are no longer able to justify
their subjects in believing their contents. The problem is that the nonreceptive
seemings (e.g., as of gold) are not adequately supported by the receptive seemings
(as of a yellow pebble) in the absence of any background knowledge, and therefore
not quasi-inferred in a proper way.
Unfortunately, this response to cognitive penetration is severely problematic for
several reasons. First, as I argue elsewhere (Ghijsen 2015), there’s simply no strong
empirical support for the claim that there are inferential transitions between two
personal-level states in ordinary cases of perception. Although our best theories of
perception might claim that there are several subpersonal states which represent
different aspects of external stimuli (e.g., first features like contrast and luminance
are represented, then features are integrated to represent objects, etc.), there’s
no reason to assume that these separate subpersonal states are also reflected as
separate states at the personal level. If this is true, then quasi-inference as it is
described by McGrath simply does not occur, thereby eliminating the possibility
of explaining problematic cases of cognitive penetration as cases of epistemically
faulty nonreceptive seemings.11
11 Although one might try to solve this problem by allowing for quasi-inferences between
subpersonal states, this only leads to other difficulties. Subpersonal mechanisms are always
“jumping to conclusions” on the basis of cues that underdetermine the actual facts, in which
case no seemings would count as receptive.
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Second, even if we assume that quasi-inferences are psychologically real, then
there is still a worry about the explanatory power of McGrath’s suggestion. Mc-
Grath, like Siegel, uses a comparison with belief to make sense of the notion of
good quasi-inferences. This comes out clearly when McGrath discusses the seeming-
transition for an expert bird watcher to whom it perceptually seems that a certain
bird is a pine warbler:
Suppose there is a seeming-transition here: the bird seems to be a pine
warbler as a result of its seeming to have certain other features which it
is hard to articulate, its seeming to have a pine warbler gestalt. Is this
a quasi-inferential transition? If it is explained by appeal to the person’s
knowledge of the observable features of pine warblers, then the answer is
yes. Suppose someone, by virtue of this knowledge, based a belief that the
bird is a pine warbler on the belief that the bird had such and such gestalt.
This would count as inference, I think. When these beliefs are exchanged
for seemings, the result is a quasi-inferential seemings-transition and so a
nonreceptive output seeming.
(McGrath 2013, p. 241)
What, in this case, makes the seeming-transition from the bird’s seeming to
have a pine warbler gestalt to the bird’s seeming to be a pine warbler a good
quasi-inference? The fact that, if the seemings had been beliefs, there would have
been an intuitively proper inference, given the expert’s background knowledge. The
background knowledge is essential for McGrath’s proposal, as this is the crucial
element that distinguishes the expert birdwatcher from a novice to whom it inap-
propriately (due to wishful thinking) seems that the bird is a pine warbler. But
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the problem precisely lies in spelling out the nature of this background knowl-
edge. If this is theoretical knowledge of the form that pine warblers look like this,
then it’s unclear where this knowledge finds its origin. It cannot be based on re-
ceptive seemings, as identifying pine warblers on the basis of receptive seemings
presupposes that one already has this background knowledge — after all, this re-
quires a good quasi-inference leading from the pine-warbler-gestalt-seeming to the
being-a-pine-warbler-seeming.
Induction and testimony will not help for similar reasons. For induction, one
needs to justifiably believe that there was a pine warbler when I had this lower-level
seeming at t1, that there was a pine warbler when I had this lower-level seeming
at t2, etc., and one simply cannot justifiably believe that there was a pine warbler
at those times without already having had the right kind of higher-level receptive
seemings at those times. For testimony, one would first have to explain how one
could have properly receptive higher-level seemings of someone’s saying that pine
warblers look such-and-so on the basis of lower-level seemings of sounds. And this
just asks for further background knowledge (about the relation between sounds
and spoken words) that would then stand in further need of being explained.
It thus seems better to think of the background knowledge in question as
know-how, an identification with which McGrath also seems to agree (2013, p. 238;
p. 242). But this raises a question as to what know-how comes down to exactly. An
externalist reading would identify this know-how with a person’s ability to reliably
identify pine warblers when one encounters them, something that should not be
included in McGrath’s internalist response to the problem of cognitive penetration.
So McGrath must have something else in mind when he speaks of a subject’s know-
how as explaining what grounds epistemically good quasi-inferences. The notion
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he has in mind is elucidated when he compares know-how to mental states that
could masquerade as it:
What if the pine-warbler-seeming is the output of a quasi-inferential transi-
tion, but the transition is made not because of the person’s learned identifi-
catory skills but because of a mental state masquerading as learned identi-
ficatory “know-how”? [. . . ] Imposters might include unreliable dispositions
resulting from poor training (e.g., the disposition to see something as a
cardinal bird if one sees it as yellow and small) and reliable but unlearned
dispositions (e.g., those which result, say, from “last night’s neurosurgery”
as Jack Lyons (2011) imagines). In either case, these are not “know-how”
but at best “belief how,” if you will. Whether the resulting seeming justifies
will therefore depend on whether such “belief how” makes it the case that
the content of the input seeming sufficiently supports the content of the
output seeming for the subject. It presumably does not if the “belief how”
counts as unreasonable but may if it counts as reasonable.
(McGrath 2013, p. 242, n. 32)
According to McGrath, know-how is neither a learned unreliable disposition,
nor a reliable unlearned disposition. Instead, know-how appears to be constituted
by learned reliable dispositions. But the reliability of a learned recognitional dis-
position is not something that is accessible to the subject, nor is it part of the
subject’s mental states. The same disposition to go from lower-level seemings to
higher-level seemings need not be reliable in different environments. For instance,
there might be environments in which cardinal birds (and cardinal birds only)
really have evolved to be yellow and small, in which case the disposition to see
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something as a cardinal bird if one sees it as yellow and small is reliable after all
in that environment. This means that there is nothing intrinsic about the relation
between lower-level seemings and higher-level seemings that makes having the ten-
dency to go from the one to the other into a reliable recognitional disposition. The
reliability of this recognitional disposition should therefore not be taken to be part
of the subject’s mental states, and therefore not as a factor to which internalists
about justification can appeal.
So McGrath does appear to rely on externalist factors in grounding epistem-
ically good quasi-inferential transitions. However, one might claim that it is not
really the reliability of the disposition that grounds good quasi-inferences. Instead,
what grounds the good quasi-inference is the fact that there just is a learned dis-
position to go from a lower-level seeming to a higher-level seeming rather than a
sudden “jump” from the one to the other on the basis of an unjustified belief or
desire. This accords with the fact that McGrath is open to the idea that reason-
able “belief-how” can also ground good quasi-inferences. Unfortunately, without
reliability in the picture, we just end up with the problem we started out with:
perceptual justification will become too easy to obtain. Suppose I trust the tes-
timony of someone who is no expert in ornithology at all.12 This can be entirely
reasonable if the person confidently and at least seemingly consistently asserts
which type of birds we are looking at. On the basis of his testimony, I come to
have several learned dispositions to go from lower-level seemings about shapes and
colors to higher-level seemings about kinds of birds. Unfortunately, because the
person I trusted was no expert at all, I come to have wrong seemings about birds
12 Let’s bracket the earlier mentioned issue of coming to have higher-level seemings about
what someone is saying on the basis of lower-level seemings about sounds.
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all the time. In this case, the higher-level bird-seemings just do not appear to jus-
tify me in believing their contents. And another type of example is easily found: I
might reasonably think I’m picking up on distinctive features of birds (say, their
color), thereby acquiring a disposition to go from certain lower-level seemings to
higher-level seemings (if it’s brown, then it’s a sparrow) but I might not be track-
ing any distinctive features at all. Again, the higher-level seemings I would then
have would not appear to justify me in believing their contents. The moral of the
story seems to be that higher-level seemings will not provide any justification if
the dispositions they are based on are not reliable.
Briefly summarized, the problem appears to be the following. McGrath, like
Siegel, attempts to discriminate good and bad seeming-transitions by comparing
them to what would be good and bad belief-transitions. But the proposed good
type of belief-transition appeals to a certain factor, i.e., background knowledge,
that cannot be appealed to in the case of seeming-transitions. Higher-level seem-
ings are needed in the first place to explain how we could arrive at propositional
background knowledge, and know-how only gets one to the correct result if it
also incorporates a reliability constraint, a factor to which internalists cannot ap-
peal. What’s more, once one uses reliability to distinguish between good and bad
quasi-inferences, there really is no more need for a comparison between belief- and
seeming-transitions anyway. One can simply explain what is good about certain
seeming-transitions immediately in terms of reliability. In good cases of cognitive
penetration, the process from experience to belief is reliable, while this is not true
for bad cases of cognitive penetration. However, this is exactly not the type of ex-
planation an internalist would want to appeal to in accommodating the problem
of cognitive penetration.
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McGrath’s proposal thus lacks a good internalist explanation of what makes
seeming-transitions epistemically (in)appropriate. But even if one could point to
an internalist factor to explain why a certain transition from a lower-level seeming
to a higher-level seeming is inappropriate, then there is an important problem left.
McGrath’s solution simply does not get at the heart of the cognitive penetration
problem by focusing only on the transition from lower-level (receptive) seemings to
higher-level (nonreceptive) seemings because, as McGrath himself mentions (2013,
p. 239, n. 25), empirical research suggests that cognitive penetration can occur even
at the earliest level of visual processing (Hansen et al 2006). If this is the case,
then one would expect that there can also be epistemically bad cases of cognitive
penetration at the lowest level, i.e., the level of receptive seemings. McGrath’s ac-
count will have no solution for such cases of cognitively penetrated yet receptive
seemings, and will have to say that they are able to provide immediate justifica-
tion.13 If one is satisfied with such an account of low-level cognitive penetration
— perhaps because one believes that the relevant intuitions can be explained by
appeal to defeat, blameworthiness, etc. — then one might as well be satisfied with
such an account at a higher level.
So neither McGrath nor Siegel are able to accommodate the problem of cog-
nitive penetration. The moral of the critique is that one cannot provide a good
internalist account of cognitive penetration in terms of the similarity between good
and bad experience-etiologies and good and bad belief-etiologies if one lacks an
adequate internalist account of what makes those etiologies good or bad in the first
place. But to find such an adequate account, internalists will first have to provide
13 The same worry about not accommodating low-level cognitive penetration also applies to
Elijah Chudnoff’s (2013) solution to the problem.
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an answer to a challenge that is even worse, namely that of the distinctiveness
problem. The next section will turn to this problem.
3 The Real Epistemic Problem of Cognitive Penetration
Briefly put, we’ve seen that the problem of cognitive penetration is that there
are cognitively penetrated perceptual experiences that are intuitively unable to
provide sufficient justification for belief because of their bad etiologies. Overly
strong desires, unjustified beliefs, fears, all these states might influence experience
to such a degree that the experience becomes more of a representation of the
content of these prior states than of what they are supposed to represent, i.e., the
subject’s environment. However, so far we have not been given any reason to think
that this focus on cognitively penetrating states is not just a red herring.
What about the following case? You bump your head and start to hallucinate.
According to Siegel (2013a), such an experience would have an a-rational etiology,
and on that basis not be a candidate for epistemic downgrade, or at least not for the
same reasons as experiences with a checkered past.14 But we could also just group
experiences with checkered pasts together with experiences that have a-rational
etiologies as types of experiences that are both part of unreliable belief-forming
processes.15 On this line of thought, cognitive penetration is just one intuitive
illustration of the fact that perceptual experiences do not provide any justification
just because they are perceptual experiences. The problem for internalists would
then be much bigger than showing how and when perceptual experiences can be
14 This last remark is needed because Siegel wants to leave open whether experiences with a-
rational etiologies can be epistemically downgraded for different reasons (Siegel 2013a, p. 700).
15 This is the line taken by Jack Lyons (2011).
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epistemically downgraded, the problem would then consist in showing why we
should think that anything would be able to provide justification just in virtue of
being a perceptual experience to begin with.
So what internalists need is a good reason to keep experiences with a checkered
past apart from experiences with a-rational etiologies. Siegel tries to motivate the
distinction by another comparison to belief: in some cases of forming beliefs “we
would not regard either ourselves or any of our subpersonal systems as convicted
of any error if we ended up with those beliefs via that kind of process, nor would
we regard the processes as making the belief rational” (Siegel 2013a, p. 713). The
relevant cases are ones in which beliefs are “zapped” into you by some external
cause; this process is not one that makes the belief rational, nor is it a process to
which one can ascribe a certain error. Siegel’s thought seems to be that when ex-
periences or beliefs arise because of prior cognitive processing, then the rationality
of these experiences or beliefs can be explained by looking at the contents of the
prior states that led to them. In the absence of prior cognitive states, beliefs and
experiences simply stop being rationally assessable, as there are no prior states on
the basis of which these beliefs and experiences could be assessed.
However, this line of thought is mistaken in two respects. First, by just looking
at the contents of prior mental states, one will not be able to assess whether a
certain resulting state is rational or not. It might be rational to go from content
A to content B in a certain environment, but not so in a different environment.
The color of a certain bird might be sufficient to rationally conclude its kind in
one environment (where only this kind of bird has that particular color), but not
in another (where other kinds of birds have the same color). Second, even without
prior mental states, there might still be ways to rationally assess experience or
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belief. For instance, one could say that bumping one’s head is a bad way of arriving
at a perceptual experience of an apple, as this is not a reliable way to come to
have accurate representations of apples. The perceptual experience might thus be
called irrational in response to the bumping of one’s head.
The point is that we have not been given any reason to think that rationality
is necessarily connected to evidential transitions between contents. Without such
a reason, the different treatment of checkered experiences and zaplike experiences
is entirely optional. And now the question is whether we should still hold on to the
idea that these experiences should be treated separately, that is, hold on to the idea
that there is something specifically problematic about cognitive penetration, or,
accept that there is a general problem about the justificatory force of experience
of which cognitive penetration is just one illustration.
Interestingly, there is reason to prefer the latter answer (Lyons 2009; Ghijsen
2014). The way in which perceptual experiences are supposed to provide justifica-
tion for beliefs is similar to the way in which beliefs provide justification for other
beliefs: they act as evidence on the basis of which a certain content is justified.
In other words, perceptual experiences, like beliefs, are supposed to evidentially
justify other beliefs. But most people agree that beliefs need to fulfill some con-
ditions other than their being beliefs to provide this justification. In particular,
beliefs need to be justified themselves before they can evidentially justify any other
belief. This need not lead to a regress of justification, as one can allow that some
beliefs are non-evidentially justified by, e.g., being the output of a reliable pro-
cess.16 Now, if one takes the analogy between perceptual experience and belief
16 See (Lyons 2009) for more on the distinction between evidential and non-evidential justi-
fication.
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seriously, as Siegel and McGrath certainly do, then one would expect there to be
a similar condition on perceptual experience: only those perceptual experiences
that are justified themselves are capable of evidentially justifying beliefs. In the
absence of a reason why perceptual experiences are not like beliefs in this respect,
there simply is no reason to assume that perceptual experiences have the special
epistemic status that Siegel and McGrath take them to have.
This challenge is strengthened by reflection on the fact that there are also
paradigm states incapable of evidentially justifying beliefs. For instance, a desire
that P or an imagination that P cannot evidentially justify a belief that P. Both
this fact, and the fact that beliefs need to be justified before they can evidentially
justify other beliefs, can be explained by supposing that all evidential justification
arises from states that are justified themselves. This leads to a problem, introduced
by Jack Lyons (2009), that I have called the distinctiveness problem (Ghijsen
2014): if one wants to uphold the idea that perceptual experiences have some sort
of special epistemic status, then one has to explain what is so distinctive about
them that allows them to evidentially justify beliefs (in contrast with desire and
imagination) without having to be justified themselves (in contrast with belief).
Note that this problem does not just arise for perceptual dogmatism. It is a
problem for all experientialist theories of perceptual justification, which suppose
that perceptual experiences provide evidence for belief simply on the basis of their
being perceptual experiences. What one needs to explain is why perceptual expe-
rience is such that no other conditions for providing evidence are required, given
that these other conditions are important in other paradigm cases of evidential
justification.
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Now I don’t think that one can find a satisfying response to this problem
without at least committing to some form of externalism. For instance, if one
holds that experiences can be justified (or epistemically proper) if they are reliable
representations of the environment, or if they are functioning properly, then one
has an explanation of when experiences can evidentially justify beliefs in the way
that other beliefs can. One could also just reject the entire idea of evidentially
justifying experiences, and instead commit to the idea that perceptual justification
is simply non-evidential in nature (Lyons 2009). Perceptual experiences are then
merely taken as part of a cognitive process that delivers justified beliefs because
of the reliability of the entire process. Of course, this is of no avail to Siegel and
McGrath, who want to have an account of the epistemic status of experience that
is compatible with internalism.
Nevertheless, if internalists are able to come up with an answer to the dis-
tinctiveness problem, then that also provides an important first step in answering
the cognitive penetration problem from an internalist perspective. An answer to
the distinctiveness problem will supposedly provide a property of perceptual ex-
perience that explains why it is able to evidentially justify belief without being
justified itself, a property that explains its special epistemic status. Bad cases of
cognitive penetration could then be expected to be cases in which this property
of perceptual experience is somehow negatively affected. All the more reason for
internalists to leave the problem of cognitive penetration for later, and focus on
the distinctiveness problem first.
Now one might think that internalists actually have some good suggestions at
their disposal for answering the distinctiveness problem, and, with it, the problem
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of cognitive penetration. Before going to the conclusion, I will briefly discuss some
of these suggestions in the next section.
4 Responses to the Distinctiveness Problem
A first internalist response to the distinctiveness problem might focus, along the
lines of Siegel (2013b, pp. 754-5), on the nature of beliefs and perceptual experi-
ences as endorsements of contents.17,18 On this response, beliefs and experiences
are able to provide evidence, unlike, say, desires, imaginations and suppositions,
because they are endorsements of contents. However, not just any endorsement
can evidentially justify beliefs; what’s needed is that the endorsements are arrived
at rationally. For beliefs, this means that they need to be held for good reasons,
whereas for experiences, it means at least that they should not be the result of
cognitive penetration by wishful thinking or overly strong desires.
For this suggestion to work, we do need a further account of when experiences
are arrived at rationally, given that it’s problematic to appeal to similarities with
belief-etiologies. But any attempt at providing such an account seems to run into
the problem of an infinite regress: prior cognitive states that are supposed to ratio-
nalize experiences will need to have some good rational standing themselves, and
this will presuppose further states with good rational standings, and so on. This
is exactly why an externalist account that allows for non-evidential justification
17 This suggestion and some of its problems were provided by an anonymous referee.
18 Note also that, as Siegel (2013b, p. 756) recognizes, an appeal to phenomenology is unlikely
to help, given that badly cognitively penetrated experiences have the same phenomenology
as good perceptual experiences. See (Ghijsen 2014) for more worries about a phenomenalist
answer to the distinctiveness problem.
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is so appealing: one can end the regress by accepting the possibility of states that
are justified without depending on rationalizing prior states.
And there is another difficulty for the suggestion that evidential justification
can only be provided by endorsements that are rationally arrived at. Many in-
ternalists, including Siegel (2013a, pp. 699-700), want to allow that hallucinations
and other experiences with a-rational etiologies can also justify one’s beliefs. But
endorsements with a-rational etiologies, like hallucinations, are ipso facto not en-
dorsements that are arrived at rationally. So the suggestion simply does not work
even by the experientialist’s own lights.
Perhaps the suggestion can be made to work if it is weakened to the thesis
that evidential justification can be provided only by endorsements that are not
irrationally arrived at. Again we would still need a better account of what counts
as an irrational etiology for experience, but at least it might evade the principled
problem of infinite regress by allowing for a-rationally arrived at justifying states
(including hallucinations) — which are different from irrationally arrived at states.
Promising as this suggestion might look for experiences, it is simply a non-starter
for beliefs. A-rationally arrived at beliefs of the zapped kind cannot evidentially
justify other beliefs, so there would still be an unexplained difference between
experience and belief.
A final response to the distinctiveness problem might therefore simply take
the special epistemic status of perceptual experience as primitive, something that
Siegel has also suggested (2013b, p. 757). But this answer to the distinctiveness
problem places experientialists in a dialectically weak position, as several forms of
externalism are able to provide a more developed answer to the question of when
and why perceptual experiences are able to provide (evidential) justification for
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belief. What’s more, taking the special epistemic status of perceptual experience
as primitive also leaves experientialism without a satisfying reply to the problem of
cognitive penetration. All in all, then, experientialists would do well to seriously
consider the distinctiveness problem before turning to the problem of cognitive
penetration.
5 Conclusion
I have argued that bad cases of cognitive penetration are just one illustration of
a much larger problem for experientialist theories of perceptual justification: they
have to explain what is so distinctive about perceptual experience that enables
it to provide evidence for beliefs merely on the basis of its being a perceptual
experience, given that beliefs are unable to provide such evidence merely because
they are beliefs. This problem is especially pressing for philosophers who, like
Siegel and McGrath, attempt to answer the problem of cognitive penetration by
appealing to an analogy with belief. Even if one were able to find a way to match
bad experience-etiologies to bad belief-etiologies, one still has to explain what it
is about such etiologies that makes them epistemically illicit. Unfortunately, there
is good reason to think that the best explanation of this fact will be externalist
rather than internalist in nature.
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